Some have blamed development failures in sub-Saharan Africa on collective political action by ethnic groups. But a new working paper by Philip Keefer shows political parties, though a key vehicle for collective political action, don't necessarily represent collective ethnic interests. The author, using Afrobarometer survey data from 16 sub-Saharan African countries, compares survey respondents belonging to ethnic groups that cluster their support around particular parties to survey respondents who don't. One definition of clustering that should be most associated with the pursuit of collective ethnic interests links a single party to a single ethnic group. But only a quarter of survey respondents belong to groups that cluster in this way. Moreover, respondents from ethnic groups clustered in this way were not significantly more likely to express a partisan preference than other respondents. This is inconsistent with the claim that competition between political parties is based on credible commitments to improve the collective welfare of ethnic groups. On the contrary, being from ethnic groups that exhibit clustering has a smaller impact on whether respondents exhibit a partisan preference than factors associated with individually-targeted political appeals. For example, respondents who receive gifts (which appeal to individual, not collective, interests) are more likely to express a partisan preference than those from clustered ethnic groups. The paper argues that ethnic clustering, rather than being a cause of worsening development outcomes, could be a byproduct of other aspects of the political environment.

Organizations across Africa are increasingly using Managing for Development Results (MfDR) concepts when implementing their programs. They adapt these tools to their own environment through linking strategies to results within an integrated process; thereby responding to African citizens' demand for more information on program performance. The members of the African Community of Practice (AfCoP) on MfDR seek to highlight this new trend towards results-oriented institutions. The case studies presented here are a snapshot of the transformative work on MfDR that is taking place in Africa today. Managing for Development Results encompasses five areas: Leadership; Monitoring and Evaluation; Accountability and Partnerships; Planning & Budgeting; Statistical Capacity. These areas combine to ensure that managers are using evidence to make decisions and development stakeholders are able to keep track of progress. It ensures that governments shift from delivering outputs, to generating real outcomes. This publication provides examples on how to produce better results in a given socio-economic African context.

This paper uses a unique data set of the Human Development Index to describe long-run human development trends for 111 countries, from 1970 to 2005. The first part of the paper shows trends by region, period and index subcomponent. The life-expectancy and education subcomponents grow faster than income. The assessment of HDI progress is sensitive to choice of measurement. The second part of the paper focuses on the differences between income and non-income determinants of human development.

This paper explores the effects of liberal macroeconomic policies and the economic crisis on informal street traders. Street traders are linked to financial markets and the crisis primarily though demand conditions: slower growth and over-trading translate into lower profits. Field research indicates that female traders' households rely significantly more than male traders' households on income generated by trading.

The financial crisis has dealt a major blow to the global economy and shaken confidence in economic management and the economic models that guide it. The crisis revealed not only major market failures -- especially in the housing bubble and its transmission to the financial system -- but glaring state failures that propagated and exacerbated the crisis. A new working paper by F. Halsey Rogers assesses whether and how the crisis should shift thinking about development economics in several domains, such as market-state balance, macroeconomic management and public spending. The author argues that new global circumstances and awareness of vulnerability should lead to some policy changes, as developing countries take steps to reduce risks, including those generated in developed countries. At the same time, the crisis should largely reinforce the post-Washington consensus on development that has emerged over the past decade -- namely, a world view that aims to achieve private sector-driven growth but sees a facilitating role for the state. This view promotes engaging with the global economy in ways that advance development and values pragmatism, experimentation and evidence-based policy making over ideology.